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供应链控制力是供应链成员主导供应链决策的权力。供应链成员间控制力的不同配比形成了不同的权力结构,进而形成了不同的供应链合作关系。供应链控制力不仅影响着参与成员的决策顺序,还会对决策变量产生影响,进而影响合作关系质量及绩效。本文针对一个零售商和一个供应商组成的生鲜品二级供应链,将零售价格视为控制力的函数,需求同时受价格、保鲜努力和随机因素的共同影响,本文构建了供应商主导的Stackelberg分散决策模型和基于一体化决策的合作博弈模型。研究表明:供应商主导的供应链合作关系中,存在最优的控制力配置水平使得各自利润最大;一体化决策下系统利润优于分散决策,但难以实现帕累托最优;回购补偿和数量弹性契约协调机制的合理设计可以实现帕累托改进,提升合作绩效。针对生鲜品的销售,更应注重提升产品品质、保障产品的新鲜度,以提升产品市场需求,保证供应链合作关系的长久稳定发展。
Abstract:Supply chain control power is that of a supply chain member to dominate supply chain decisions. The different proportion of control power among supply chain members forms different power structures,and then forms different supply chain relationships. Supply chain control power not only affects the decision-making sequence of the participants,but also affects the decision variables,and then affects the quality and performance of the cooperative relationship. Considering a fresh food supply chain composed of a retailer and a supplier,where the retail price is regarded as a function of control power,and the demand is affected by price,freshness-keeping effort and random factors at the same time,both the Stackelberg game model dominated by suppliers and the cooperative game model based on integrated decision-making are constructed. Numerical results show that( 1)in the supplier dominated supply chain,there is an optimal allocation of control power to maximize their respective profits;( 2) under the integrated decision-making,the system profit is better than the decentralized decision-making,but it is difficult to achieve Pareto optimization;( 3) the reasonable design of buyback compensation and quantity flexibility contract mechanisms can achieve Pareto improvement and realize win-win relationships for the two members. For the sales of fresh products,improving product quality and ensuring the freshness of products is very important to enhance the market demand of products and ensure the long-term and stable development of supply chain cooperation.
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基本信息:
DOI:10.15981/j.cnki.dongyueluncong.2021.06.006
中图分类号:F274
引用信息:
[1]王淑云,张艳.供应商具有价格控制力的供应链合作双赢研究[J].东岳论丛,2021,42(06):46-59+191.DOI:10.15981/j.cnki.dongyueluncong.2021.06.006.
基金信息:
国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:72072154;71672166); 山东省社会科学规划研究项目(项目编号:17CKJJ11)
2021-06-23
2021-06-23
2021-06-23
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