东岳论丛

参考文献

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①S.Shavell(1987)的《事故法的经济分析》,A.M.Polinsky(2009),Cooter和Ulen(2011),以及兰德斯和波斯纳的《侵权法的经济结构》(1987)这些主流法律经济学教科书均持有这种观点,对于侵权法的经济分析是一脉相承的。

①我们可以正式地表述这一问题:预期成本是x+p(x)[y-x]=[1-p(x)]x+p(x)y,而在非金钱支出预防努力情况下,预期成本为x+p(x)y。

①Cook教授还有一段解释有限责任重要性的著名的话:“对公司债务的个人责任以其股票出资额为限,在工业化的世界,这创造了大量奇迹。如果像这样的自由一旦不存在的话,公众就不敢去买股票,因为他们要为公司的债务负担其最终责任。不过,这种责任的有限性,是在出资额以外的有限性。”